Minimalism and the Definability of Truth

Abstract
In this paper I am going to inquire to what extent the main requirements of a minimalist theory of truth and falsity (as formulated, for example, by Horwich and Field) can be consistently implemented in a formal theory. I will discuss several of the existing logical theories of truth, including Tarski-type (un)definability results, Kripke’s partial interpretation of truth and falsity, Barwise and Moss’ theory based upon non-well-founded sets, McGee’s treatment of truth as a vague predicate, and Hintikka’s languages of imperfect information, to see which axioms of the minimalist theory they satisfy or fail to satisfy. Finally, I will discuss the relation between the minimalist program and compositionality
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