Synthese 41 (2):175 - 184 (1979)
|Abstract||Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we accept Wheeler's criteria for the reality of kinds and properties, we have no good reason to accept these assumptions.|
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