Normative naturalism and the challenge of relativism: Laudan versus Worrall on the justification of methodological principles
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1):37 – 51 (1996)
In a recent exchange, John Worrall and Larry Laudan have debated the merits of the model of rational scientific change proposed by Laudan in his book Science and Values. On the model advocated by Laudan, rational change may take place at the level of scientific theory and methodology, as well as at the level of the epistemic aims of science. Moreover, the rationality of a change which occurs at any one of these three levels may be dependent on considerations at the remaining levels. Yet, in spite of the avowedly anti-relativistic motivation of Laudan's model, Worrall criticizes Laudan for irrevocably relativizing scientific rationality to historically variant methodological standards.
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas S. Kuhn (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
L. Laudan (1977). Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. University of California Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Howard Sankey (2013). How the Epistemic Relativist May Use the Sceptic's Strategy: A Reply to Markus Seidel. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):140-144.
Howard Sankey (2014). On Relativism and Pluralism: Response to Steven Bland. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:98-103.
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