David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):196-202 (2009)
This paper reviews the situation with respect to the referential approach to the problem of semantic incommensurability. It argues that the thesis of semantic incommensurability does not pose a significant threat to scientific realism. However, there exists a "non-realist" defence of incommensurability, according to which the referential approach begs the question against advocates of the incommensurability thesis. This defence is criticized, and the basis for a realist response to incommensurability is presented.
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References found in this work BETA
Hartry Field (1973). Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.
Philip Kitcher (1978). Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change. Philosophical Review 87 (4):519-547.
Michael Martin (1971). Referential Variance and Scientific Objectivity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):17-26.
Robert Nola (2008). The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: The Case of the Electron. In Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (eds.), Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison. Springer.
Eric Oberheim, Hanne Andersen & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1996). On Incommensurability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (1):131-141.
Citations of this work BETA
Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
Howard Sankey (2009). A Curious Disagreement: Response to Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):210-212.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Eric Oberheim (2009). Reference, Ontological Replacement and Neo-Kantianism: A Reply to Sankey. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):203-209.
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