Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis

Abstract
This paper reviews the situation with respect to the referential approach to the problem of semantic incommensurability. It argues that the thesis of semantic incommensurability does not pose a significant threat to scientific realism. However, there exists a "non-realist" defence of incommensurability, according to which the referential approach begs the question against advocates of the incommensurability thesis. This defence is criticized, and the basis for a realist response to incommensurability is presented.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Martin (1971). Referential Variance and Scientific Objectivity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):17-26.
Eric Oberheim, Hanne Andersen & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1996). On Incommensurability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (1):131-141.

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Citations of this work BETA
Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
Howard Sankey (2009). A Curious Disagreement: Response to Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):210-212.
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