Scientific realism and the inevitability of science

Abstract
This paper examines the question of whether scientific realism is committed to the inevitability of science or is consistent with claims of the contingency of science. In order to address this question, a general characterization of the position of scientific realism is presented. It is then argued that scientific realism has no evident implications with regard to the inevitability of science. A historical case study is presented in which contingency plays a significant role, and the appropriate realist response to this case study is indicated. Finally, it is argued that, when conjoined with a reliabilist theory of method, realism does have implications for the inevitability of science.
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References found in this work BETA
Howard Sankey (2001). Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98):35-54.
Citations of this work BETA
Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Simon Lohse (2011). On Naturalizing Kuhn's Essential Tension. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):215-218.
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