David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 23 (4):475-491 (2008)
I show that gene regulation networks are qualitatively consistent and therefore sufficiently similar to linearly seperable connectionist networks to warrant that the connectionist framework be applied to gene regulation. On this view, natural selection designs gene regulation networks to overcome the difficulty of development. I offer some general lessons about their evolvability that can be learned by examining the generic features of connectionist networks.
|Keywords||Philosophy Evolutionary Biology Philosophy of Biology|
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