The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to Barker

Dialogue 16 (3):485-498 (1977)
According to John A Barker, whether an argument begs the question is purely a matter of logical form. According to me, it is also a matter of epistemic conditions; some arguments which beg the question in some contexts need not beg the question in every context. I point out difficulties in Barker's treatment and defend my own views against some of his criticisms. In the concluding section, "Alleged difficulties with disjunctive syllogism," I defend the validity of disjunctive syllogism against the views of Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel D Belnap, Jr., ask pointed questions about the notion of intensional disjunction, and suggest how my treatment of begging the question can be extended to deal with the so-called paradoxes of strict implication
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300045534
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John Woods & Douglas Walton (1982). The Petitio: Aristotle'S Five Ways. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (March):77-100.

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