David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 17 (1):63-73 (2002)
If there are vague numbers, it would be easier to use numbers as semantic values in a treatment of vagueness while avoiding precise cut-off points. When we assign a particular statement a range of values (less than 1 and greater than 0) there is no precise sharp cut-off point that locates the greatest lower bound or the least upper bound of the interval, I should like to say. Is this possible? “Vague Numbers” stands for awareness of the problem. I do not present a serious theory of vague numbers. I sketch some reasons for using a many-value semantics. These reasons refer to my earlier treatments of determinacy and definitions of higher-order borderline cases. I also sketch how definitions of independence use the determinacy operator. The distinction between actually assigned values and values whose assignments are acceptable helps avoid unwanted precise cut-off points.
|Keywords||avoiding inappropriate precision determinacy disjunctive predicates higher-order borderline cases logical independence many-value semantics vagueness|
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