What is a Truth Functional Component?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Logique Et Analyse 52:4483-486 (1970)
Although the truth value (falsity) of "Henry knows that (dogs live in trees and beavers chew wood)" remains unchanged no matter what sentence is substituted in it for "beavers chew wood", we want not to regard the second as a truth functional component (tfc) of the first. Many definitions of "tfc" (e.g., Quine's) fail to insure satisfaction of the following principle: if p is a component of r which is in turn a component of q, then p is a tfc of q if and only if 1) p is also a tfc of r, and 2) r is also a tfc of q.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
João Marcos (2009). What is a Non-Truth-Functional Logic? Studia Logica 92 (2):215 - 240.
Simone Gozzano (2013). Reconsidering the Logic of Emotion. Philosophia 41 (3):787-794.
David Sherry (1999). Note on the Scope of Truth-Functional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):327-328.
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). The Causal Argument Against Component Forces. Dialectica 63 (4):525-554.
Douglas Patterson (2002). Theories of Truth and Convention T. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (5):1-16.
Theodore J. Everett (2000). A Simple Logic for Comparisons and Vagueness. Synthese 123 (2):263-278.
Stephen Barker (2003). Truth and Conventional Implicature. Mind 112 (445):1-34.
Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
Rafael De Clercq (2008). The Structure of Aesthetic Properties. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):894-909.
Daniel J. Hill & Stephen K. McLeod (2010). On Truth-Functionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632.
Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij (forthcoming). Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence. In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, K. Fujimoto & J. Martínez-Fernández (eds.), Volume on Truth. Springer.
Peter Smith (1998). Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):253-277.
Adam Morton (1969). Extensional and Non-Truth-Functional Contexts. Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-06-03
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?