Synthese 86 (3):321 - 347 (1991)
|Abstract||This paper outlines a general theory of efficient causation, a theory that deals in a unified way with traditional or deterministic, indeterministic, probabilistic, and other causal concepts. Theorists like Lewis, Salmon, and Suppes have attempted to broaden our causal perspective by reductively analysing causal notions in other terms. By contrast, the present theory rests in the first place on a non-reductive analysis of traditional causal concepts — into formal or structural components, on the one hand, and a physical or metaphysical component, on the other. The analyzans is then generalised. The theory also affords a more general propensity notion than is standard, one that helps solve major problems facing propensity interpretations of probability.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Thomas Müller (2005). Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487 - 520.
Iain Martel, Probabilistic Empiricism: In Defence of a Reichenbachian Theory of Causation and the Direction of Time.
Peter Menzies (1989). Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663.
Richard Otte (1987). Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Christian Jakob (2006). Hitchcock's (2001) Treatment of Singular and General Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3).
Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2012). Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):115-143.
Frank Hofmann (2007). Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):173 - 182.
Menno Hulswit (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):261 - 287.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #202,056 of 549,267 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,267 )
How can I increase my downloads?