General causation

Synthese 86 (3):321 - 347 (1991)
This paper outlines a general theory of efficient causation, a theory that deals in a unified way with traditional or deterministic, indeterministic, probabilistic, and other causal concepts. Theorists like Lewis, Salmon, and Suppes have attempted to broaden our causal perspective by reductively analysing causal notions in other terms. By contrast, the present theory rests in the first place on a non-reductive analysis of traditional causal concepts — into formal or structural components, on the one hand, and a physical or metaphysical component, on the other. The analyzans is then generalised. The theory also affords a more general propensity notion than is standard, one that helps solve major problems facing propensity interpretations of probability.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00485264
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References found in this work BETA
D. H. Mellor (2004). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge University Press.

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David Miller (1991). Single-Case Probabilities. Foundations of Physics 21 (12):1501-1516.

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