Philosophical Papers 31 (2):117-143 (2002)
|Abstract||Abstract We act so as to make things better than they would have been but for the action; we are horrified by an uncontrollable catastrophe because it made things so much worse than they would have been without it. Such attitudes are reasonable only if it is reasonable to make the associated counterfactual conditional judgments. But making such judgments cannot be reasonable if one holds both (1) that this world is absolutely and uniquely actual (?absolute actualism?), and (2) that everything is settled (?ES?). Determinism (strictly understood) figures as the most obvious example of ES theory, but ES can occur in an indeterministic form too: both forms are considered|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Vallentyne (1988). Explicating Lawhood. Philosophy of Science 55 (4):598-613.
Christopher McMahon (2009). Reasonable Disagreement: A Theory of Political Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Justin P. McBrayer (2010). Skeptical Theism. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1994). Consequential Omnibenevolence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 47:207-222.
Christopher Menzel (1990). Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics. Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.
Barry Stroud (2009). Scepticism and the Senses. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):559-570.
Ruth Chang (2004). All Things Considered. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
David Halliburton (1997). The Fateful Discourse of Worldly Things. Stanford University Press.
Joseph K. Campbell (ed.) (2004). Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Robert Shaver (2006). Sidgwick on Moral Motivation. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (1):1-14.
Richard J. Arneson (2000). Perfectionism and Politics. Ethics 111 (1):37-63.
Derk Pereboom (2005). Defending Hard Incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads11 ( #99,650 of 549,754 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,754 )
How can I increase my downloads?