David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (2):175-215 (2010)
This paper studies how legal choices, and in particular legislative determinations, need to consider multiple rights and values, and can be assessed accordingly. First it is argued that legal norms (and in particular constitutional right-norms) often prescribe the pursuit of goals, which may be in conflict one with another. Then a model of teleological reasoning is brought to bear on choices affecting different goals, among which those prescribed by constitutional norms. An analytical framework is provided for evaluating such choices with regard to possible alternatives. The assessment of legislative choices according to proportionality is then considered, and is modelled using the provided analytical framework. Finally, the framework is expanded to include the ideas of reasonableness and institutional deference, and the corresponding margins of appreciation
|Keywords||Argumentation Proportionality Teleological reasoning Values Norms Constitutional review|
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Jeffrey (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press.
Jeremy Waldron (1999). Law and Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1993). The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press.
K. G. Binmore (2005). Natural Justice. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Trevor Bench-Capon, Michał Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex, Filipe Borges, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack G. Conrad, Enrico Francesconi, Thomas F. Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen L. Leidner, David D. Lewis, Ronald P. Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas N. Walton & Adam Z. Wyner (2012). A History of AI and Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI and Law. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):215-319.
Marc Lauritsen (2015). On Balance. Artificial Intelligence and Law 23 (1):23-42.
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