Folk Moral Relativism

Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505 (2011)
It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend to adopt different views depending on the degree to which they consider radically different perspectives on moral questions.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x
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Victor Kumar (2015). Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
Nicholas Smyth (2014). Resolute Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (4):1-12.

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