How to be responsible for something without causing it

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336 (2004)
What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be morally responsible for things that we cause.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00031.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1979). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Brad Weslake (2013). Proportionality, Contrast and Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):785-797.
Carolina Sartorio (2012). Resultant Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):63-86.

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