Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336 (2004)
|Abstract||What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be morally responsible for things that we cause.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Rita C. Manning (1984). Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood. Journal of Business Ethics 3 (1):77 - 84.
Susan Leigh Anderson (1995). Being Morally Responsible for an Action Versus Acting Responsibly or Irresponsibly. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:451-462.
Benjamin Vilhauer (2009). Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.
Coleen Macnamara (2011). Holding Others Responsible. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.
Friderik Klampfer (2004). Moral Responsibility for Unprevented Harm. Acta Analytica 19 (33):119-161.
Neal Judisch (2005). Responsibility, Manipulation and Ownership: Reflections on the Fischer/Ravizza Program. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):115-130.
Marie-Therese Miller (2009). Managing Responsibilities. Chelsea House.
Gerald K. Harrison (2009). Hooray! We're Not Morally Responsible! Think 8 (23):87-95.
Oisín Deery (2007). Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame. Res Publica 13 (3).
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #59,615 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,010 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?