Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It

Philosophical Studies 154 (02):161 - 184 (2011)
Abstract
Internalism about a person's good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person's well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person's good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one's good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don't end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls 'two-tier internalism' would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one's good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one's good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person's good do not look promising.
Keywords internalism  well-being  welfare  hedonism  desire satisfactionism  intrinsic value  motivation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,084
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 16 references

Citations of this work BETA
Jason Raibley (2013). Health and Well-Being. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):469-489.
Similar books and articles
Elinor Mason (2008). An Argument Against Motivational Internalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
Michael Bergmann (2000). Deontology and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
Kent Hurtig (2006). Internalism and Accidie. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):517 - 543.
George Pappas (2006). Access Internalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):159-169.
David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
Eric Wiland (2000). Good Advice and Rational Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-02-18

Total downloads

71 ( #22,056 of 1,101,944 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #28,723 of 1,101,944 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.