Legal concepts as inferential nodes and ontological categories
Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (3):217-251 (2009)
| Abstract | I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology (a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications, and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from the belief in the concept’s applicability, which also involves the acceptance of the concept’s constitutive inferences. For making this distinction, the inferential and eliminative analysis of legal concepts proposed by Alf Ross will be connected to the views on theoretical concepts in science advanced by Frank Ramsey and Rudolf Carnap. Consequently, the mere comprehension of a legal concept will be distinguished from the application of the concept to a particular legal system, since application presupposes a doctrinal commitment, namely, the belief that the inferences constituting the concept hold in that system. Then, I shall consider how concepts can be characterised by defining the corresponding terms and placing them within an ontology. Finally, I shall argue that there is a tension between the inferential and the ontological approach, but that both need to be taken into account, to capture the meaning and the cognitive function of legal concepts. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesGuiraude Lame (2004). Using NLP Techniques to Identify Legal Ontology Components: Concepts and Relations. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (4):379-396.
Kurt Jax (2007). Can We Define Ecosystems? On the Confusion Between Definition and Description of Ecological Concepts. Acta Biotheoretica 55 (4).
Girolamo Tessuto (2008). Legal Concepts and Terminography : Analysis and Application. In V. K. Bhatia, Christopher Candlin & Paola Evangelisti Allori (eds.), Language, Culture and the Law: The Formulation of Legal Concepts Across Systems and Cultures. P. Lang.
Xiang Chen (2003). Object and Event Concepts: A Cognitive Mechanism of Incommensurability. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):962-974.
Xiang Chen (2003). Object and Event Concepts: A Cognitive Mechanism of Incommensurability. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):962-974.
Masaki Kurematsu & Takahira Yamaguchi (1997). A Legal Ontology Refinement Support Environment Using a Machine-Readable Dictionary. Artificial Intelligence and Law 5 (1-2).
Jos Lehmann, Joost Breuker & Bob Brouwer (2004). Causation in AI and Law. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (4):279-315.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-08-24Total downloads15 ( #78,551 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
