Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 51 (March):79-84 (1991)
|Abstract||In Wittgenstein on Meaning, Colin McGinn argues that the skeptical argument that Kripke distills from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations generates at most what might be called meaning skepticism (the non-factuality view of meaning), and not concept skepticism (the non-factuality view of concepts). If correct, this would mean the skeptical reasoning is far less significant than Kripke thinks. Others have seemed to agree with McGinn. I argue that McGinn is wrong here--that, in fact, Kripke's skeptical reasoning has a straightforward extension to concepts. Whether the reasoning succeeds, however, is another matter, which I do not address here|
|Keywords||Logic Meaning Scepticism Kripke, S Mcginn, C|
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