David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Artificial Intelligence and Law 1 (2-3):209-235 (1992)
This article proposes a formal analysis of a fundamental aspect of legal reasoning: dealing with normative conflicts. Firstly, examples are illustrated concerning the dynamics of legal systems, the application of rules and exceptions, and the semantic indeterminacy of legal sources. Then two approaches to cope with conflicting information are presented: the preferred theories of Brewka, and the belief change functions of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. The relations between those approaches are closely examined, and some aspects of a model of reasoning with normative conflicts are outlined. Since this model takes into account an ordering of the involved regulations, criteria to order legal norms are finally specified.
|Keywords||non-monotonic reasoning belief revision rules and exceptions normative conflicts|
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References found in this work BETA
C. E. Alchourrón & D. Makinson (1981). New Studies in Deontic Logic. In Risto Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic. 125--148.
Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson (1985). On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
Carlos E. Alchourrón & David Makinson (1985). On the Logic of Theory Change: Safe Contraction. Studia Logica 44 (4):405 - 422.
Carlos E. Alchourron & David Makinson (1982). On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction Functions and Their Associated Revision Functions. Theoria 48 (1):14-37.
Gerhard Brewka (1991). Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundations of Commonsense. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Giovanni Sartor (1994). A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation. Ratio Juris 7 (2):177-211.
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