David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Artificial Intelligence and Law 10 (1-3):95-112 (2002)
This paper proposes to model legal reasoning asdialectical theory-constructiondirected by teleology. Precedents are viewed asevidence to be explained throughtheories. So, given a background of factors andvalues, the parties in a case canbuild their theories by using a set of operators,which are called theory constructors.The objective of each party is to provide theoriesthat both explain the evidence (theprecedents) and support the decision wished by thatparty. This leads to theory-basedargumentation, i.e., a dialectical exchange ofcompeting theories, which support opposedoutcomes by explaining the same evidence and appealingto the same values. The winneris the party that can reply with a more coherent theoryto all theories of its adversary.
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Citations of this work BETA
Phan Minh Dung & Phan Minh Thang (2009). Modular Argumentation for Modelling Legal Doctrines in Common Law of Contract. Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (3):167-182.
Henry Prakken & Giovanni Sartor (2004). The Three Faces of Defeasibility in the Law. Ratio Juris 17 (1):118-139.
Trevor Bench-Capon, Michał Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex, Filipe Borges, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack G. Conrad, Enrico Francesconi, Thomas F. Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen L. Leidner, David D. Lewis, Ronald P. Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas N. Walton & Adam Z. Wyner (2012). A History of AI and Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI and Law. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):215-319.
T. J. M. Bench-Capon (2012). Representing Popov V Hayashi with Dimensions and Factors. Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (1):15-35.
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