Philosophical Review 119 (3):273-313 (2010)
|Abstract||It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary things cannot coincide, that they cannot ﬁt into the same place nor be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of counter-examples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular sorts of ordinary thing. Since both the anti-coincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples ﬂow from the folk conception of ordinary things, the paradoxes threaten this conception with inconsistency.|
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