Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP

Analysis 74 (3):363-370 (2014)
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Abstract

Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories in the philosophy of mind are offered as explanations of what it is that makes a mental state a conscious state. According to HOP, a mental state is conscious just in case it is itself represented in a quasi-perceptual way by an internal monitor or scanning device. We start with one of the more popular objections to HOP and a seemingly innocuous concession to it: identifying the internal monitor with the faculty of attention. We show how this concession undermines HOP.

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Author Profiles

William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

References found in this work

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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Content and Consciousness.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1969 - New York,: Humanities P..

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