Graduate studies at Western
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):293-305 (2008)
|Abstract||Following Lewis, it is widely held that branching worlds differ in important ways from diverging worlds. There is, however, a simple and natural semantics under which ordinary sentences uttered in branching worlds have much the same truth values as they conventionally have in diverging worlds. Under this semantics, whether branching or diverging, speakers cannot say in advance which branch or world is theirs. They are uncertain as to the outcome. This same semantics ensures the truth of utterances typically made about quantum mechanical contingencies, including statements of uncertainty, if the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is true. The ‘incoherence problem’ of the Everett interpretation, that it can give no meaning to the notion of uncertainty, is thereby solved. IntroductionMetaphysicsPersonal fissionBranching worldsPhysicsObjections|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Similar books and articles
Peter J. Lewis (2009). Probability, Self‐Location, and Quantum Branching. Philosophy of Science 76 (5).
Alberto Zanardo (2006). Quantification Over Sets of Possible Worlds in Branching-Time Semantics. Studia Logica 82 (3):379 - 400.
Jiri Benovsky (2005). Branching Versus Divergent Possible Worlds. Kriterion 19:12-20.
Peter J. Lewis (2007). Uncertainty and Probability for Branching Selves. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (1):1-14.
N. Belnap & T. Muller (2010). Branching with Uncertain Semantics: Discussion Note on Saunders and Wallace, 'Branching and Uncertainty'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):681-696.
Alastair Wilson (2012). Everettian Quantum Mechanics Without Branching Time. Synthese 188 (1):67-84.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #20,479 of 751,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)29 ( #4,189 of 751,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?