Chateaubriand's Realist Conception of Logic

Axiomathes 20 (2-3):357-364 (2010)
I present the realist conception of logic supported by Oswaldo Chateaubriand which integrates ontological and epistemological aspects, opposing it to mathematical and linguistic conceptions. I give special attention to the peculiarities of his hierarchy of types in which some properties accumulate and others have a multiple degree. I explain such deviations of the traditional conception, showing the underlying purpose in each of these peculiarities. I compare the ideas of Chateaubriand to the similar ideas of Frege, Tarski and Gödel. I suggest a view of the logical properties in terms of the Aristotelian notion of focal meaning and I give a formal expression to the type of the entities in the hierarchy proposed by Chateaubriand.
Keywords Nature of logic  Hierarchy of types  Cumulativity  Degree flexibility  Logical properties  Logical truths  Focal meaning  Tarski  Gödel
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-010-9109-9
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John Corcoran & Alfred Tarski (1986). What Are Logical Notions? History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.

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