Graduate studies at Western
Axiomathes 20 (2-3):357-364 (2010)
|Abstract||I present the realist conception of logic supported by Oswaldo Chateaubriand which integrates ontological and epistemological aspects, opposing it to mathematical and linguistic conceptions. I give special attention to the peculiarities of his hierarchy of types in which some properties accumulate and others have a multiple degree. I explain such deviations of the traditional conception, showing the underlying purpose in each of these peculiarities. I compare the ideas of Chateaubriand to the similar ideas of Frege, Tarski and Gödel. I suggest a view of the logical properties in terms of the Aristotelian notion of focal meaning and I give a formal expression to the type of the entities in the hierarchy proposed by Chateaubriand.|
|Keywords||Nature of logic Hierarchy of types Cumulativity Degree flexibility Logical properties Logical truths Focal meaning Tarski Gödel|
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