David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146 (2012)
I advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to fictional characters, a kind of fictional entities, involve a crucial reference to the world in which they are supposed to be instantiated. I argue that these representational properties are problematic for Priest’s theory and that he cannot accept an unrestricted version of the principle of characterization. Thus, while not refuting Priest’s theory, I show that it is no better off than other Meinongian theories.
|Keywords||Fictional objects Non-existence Principle of characterization Graham priest Noneism Fiction Possible worlds|
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References found in this work BETA
Kendall L. Walton (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
Terence Parsons (1980). Nonexistent Objects. Yale University Press.
Graham Priest (2005). Towards Non-Being. Clarendon Press.
Peter van Inwagen (1977). Creatures of Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):299 - 308.
Diane Proudfoot (2006). Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):9 - 40.
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