Modal Scepticism, Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds

Philosophia 40 (2):403-409 (2012)
Abstract
I formulate and defend two sceptical theses on specific parts of our modal knowledge (unqualified and absolute modalities). My main point is that unqualified modal sentences are defective in that they fail to belong unambiguously to specific modal kinds and thus cannot be evaluated; hence, we must be sceptical of beliefs involving them
Keywords Modal scepticism  Absolute modality  Modal kinds
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Biggs (2011). Abduction and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.

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