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- Julian Savulescu (1998). Consequentialism, Reasons, Value and Justice. Bioethics 12 (3):212–235.Over the past 10 years, John Harris has made important contributions to thinking about distributive justice in health care. In his latest work, Harris controversially argues that clinicians should stop prioritising patients according to prognosis. He argues that the good or benefit of health care is providing each individual with an opportunity to live the best and longest life possible for him or her. I call this thesis, opportunism. For the purpose of distribution of resources in health care, Harris rejects welfarism (the thesis that the good of health care is well-being) and argues that utilitarianism in general may lead to de facto discrimination against groups of people needing health care. I argue that well-being is a superior theory of the good of health care to Harris' opportunism. Harris' concerns about utilitarianism can be better addressed by: (i) relating justice more closely to reasons for action; (ii) by conceptualising the relationship between reasons for action and the value of the consequences of those actions as a plateau rather than scalar relationship. Justice can be understood as satisfying as many equally rational claims on resources as possible. The rationality of a person's claim on health resources turns on the strength of that person's reasons to promote certain health-related states of affairs. I argue that the strength of that reason does not track the expected value of that state of affairs in a fully scalar fashion. Rather a person can have most reason to promote some state of affairs, even though he or she could promote other more valuable states of affairs. Thus there can be equal reason for a distributor of public resources to save either of two people, even though one will have a better and more valuable life. This approach, while addressing many of Harris' concerns about utilitarianism, does not imply that doctors should give up prioritising patients according to prognosis altogether, but it does allow that patients with lower but reasonable prognosis should have a share of public resources.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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: Bioethics has focused principally on ethical issues arising in clinical medicine. When it has addressed justice or equity, it has focused on access to health care and on defending a general moral right to health care. This dual focus on establishing a right to health care and on health care rather than health has left bioethics largely silent on two issues of fundamental importance for a full account of justice and health. First, the focus on establishing a right to health care has contributed to a failure to address difficult issues in developing ethical standards for equitably prioritizing limited resources in health care. Second, the focus on inequalities in access to health care has ignored the much greater impact of social determinants of health, in particular socioeconomic class and inequality, on health and health inequalities. Bioethics must broaden its agenda.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... If ‘community’ is the answer, what is the problem? While questions undoubtedly arise in allocating resources to public health, such as ‘how much?’ and ‘to whom?’, we already have answers based on (i) the observation that disease and illness are bad, (ii) views of justice and fairness and (iii) an appreciation of market failure. What does the concept of community add to the existing answers? Not nothing, I shall argue, but not much either. In some cases, health providers should take advantage of ties of community to deliver services more effectively. The desire to preserve communities may have some minor implications for devolved health care funding. The value of community may set some limits to inequalities in access to health care. That’s about it. I do consider some other claims of behalf of the concept, e.g. that people would not support justice in health care without a sense of community; but I don’t find these claims very plausible. Finally, I point out some ways in which communities can be damaged by the promotion of public health understood as population health.
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| | Other links: phe.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper proposes an ethical framework for rationing publicly financed health care. We begin by classifying alternative rationing criteria according to their ethical basis. We then examine the ethical arguments for four rationing criteria. These alternatives include rationing high technology services, non-basic services, services to patients who receive the least medical benefit, and services that are not equally available to all. We submit that a just health care system will not limit basic health care to persons unable to pay for it. Furthermore, justice in health care requires limiting publicly-financed non-basic health care, striving for equality in access to basic health care, and relying on medical benefit to ration non-basic health care. Keywords: access to health care, allocation of resources, cost containment, equality, justice, medical technology, public policy, rationing, right to health care CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This comment on the case presented in ‘Cholera and Nothing More’ argues that the physicians at this public-health centre did not have an ordinary clinician's obligations to promote the health of the people who came to them for care, as they were instead set up to serve a laudable and urgent public-health goal, namely, controlling a cholera outbreak. It argues that, nonetheless, these physicians did have some limited moral duties to care for other diseases they encountered—some ancillary-care duties—arising from their voluntarily entering into a kind of intimate relationship with the patients they took in, one in which those patients effectively waive certain rights to bodily and medical privacy.
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| | Other links: phe.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Many countries have not considered palliative care a public health problem. With limited resources, disease-oriented therapies and prevention measures take priority. In this paper, I intend to describe the moral framework for considering palliative care as a public health priority in resource-poor countries. A distributive theory of justice for health care should consider integrative palliative care as morally required as it contributes to improving normal functioning and preserving opportunities for the individual. For patients requiring terminal care , we are guided less by principles of justice and more by the duty to relieve suffering and society's commitment to protecting the professional's obligation to uphold principles of beneficence, compassion and non-abandonment. A fair deliberation process is necessary to allow these strong moral commitments to serve as reasons when setting priorities in resource poor countries.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper I address the relation between just claims to health care and severe cognitive impairment from dementia. Two general approaches to justice in allocation of health care are distinguished – prudential allocation and interpersonal distribution. First, I analyze why a patient who has died has no further claims to health care. Second, I show why prudential allocators would not provide for health care treatment should they be in a persistent vegetative state. Third, I argue that the destruction of personal identity from severe dementia implies that only claims to palliative, but not life-sustaining, health care remain. Finally, I argue that the prudential allocator approach is indeterminate regarding life-sustaining care for the moderately demented and that social policy should not deny that care to patients. Keywords: elderly, health care, the severely-demented, justice CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The language of rights is increasingly used to regulate access to health care and allocation of resources in the health care field. The right to health has been grounded on different theories of justice. Scholars within the liberal tradition have grounded the right to health care on Rawls's two principles of justice. Thus, the right to health care has been justified as being one of the basic liberties, as enabling equality of opportunity, or as being justified by the maximin principle. In this article, Filc analyzes—from a radical egalitarian standpoint—the limitations of the different attempts to ground an equal right to health on Rawls's theory of justice and offers a first approximation to a radical egalitarian formulation of the right to health.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: ingentaconnect.com openurl.ingenta.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: ingentaconnect.com openurl.ingenta.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper, I want to scrutinise the value of utilising the concept of disease for a theory of distributive justice in health care. Although many people believe that the presence of a disease-related condition is a prerequisite of a justified claim on health care resources, the impact of the philosophical debate on the concept of disease is still relatively minor. This is surprising, because how we conceive of disease determines the amount of justified claims on health care resources. Therefore, the severity of scarcity depends on our interpretation of the concept of disease. I want to defend a specific combination of a theory of disease with a theory of distributive justice. A naturalist account of disease, together with sufficientarianism, is able to perform a gate-keeping function regarding entitlements to medical treatment. Although this combination cannot solve all problems of justice in health care, it may inform rationing decisions as well.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... There are good reasons — both medical and moral — for wanting to redistribute health care resources, and American hospitals and physicians are already involved in the practice of redistribution. However, such redistribution compromises both patient autonomy and the fiduciary relationship essential to medicine. These important values would be most completely preserved by a system in which patients themselves would be the agents of redistribution, by sharing their medical resources. Consequently, we should see whether patients would be willing to share before we resort to surreptitiously redistributing their resources or denying medical care to some who want and need it. We should change our health care payments systems to allow patients to donate their medical benefits to those in need.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper will explore the application of an account of justice in health and health care to the special case of children. It is tempting to hold that children require no special treatment in an account of just health care; justice requires guaranteeing access to at least basic health care services to all persons, whatever their age group, within the constraints of a society's resources. However, I will argue that for a number of reasons we need to address what justice requires specifically for children from the health care system, even if the answer must be embedded within a general account of justice in health and health care.
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| | Other links: jmp.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Julian Savulescu, Consequentialism, reasons, value and justice
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