David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Because names from fiction, names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, fail to refer, and because it has been supposed that all simple predicative sentences including a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ will be true if and only if the referent of the name has the property encoded by the predicate, many philosophers have denied that the sentence or an utterance of the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could be true, or at least, it cannot be true taken at face value. Despite this, natural language speakers appear to engage in sensible conversations using these kinds of sentences, and appear to convey information to one another in doing so. At least one response open to the the pure non-literalist is to maintain that the utterances of the sentences by speakers engaged in such conversations are literally false, but that those utterances should be interpreted as pragmatically conveying information about what is true according to the story. First, I argue that these pragmatically oriented story operator accounts cannot capture all of the true readings of an utterance of a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’. Indeed, as I also note, these objections apply to any story operator account of fictional discourse, semantic versions too. Second, I offer arguments that not only are there other true readings, but that those readings should be taken as what is literally said by speakers in uttering sentences like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’.
|Keywords||Fictional names Story operators Literal truth Semantics Pragmatics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Peter Alward (2011). Description, Disagreement, and Fictional Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):423-448.
Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.
Christopher Gauker (2012). Semantics and Pragmatics. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
Jeffrey Goodman (2004). A Defense of Creationism in Fiction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):131-155.
Thomas A. Sebeok (1980). "You Know My Method": A Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes. Gaslight Publications.
David Rozema (2012). Not the Crime, but the Man: Sherlock Holmes and Charles Augustus Milverton. In Philip Tallon & David Baggett (eds.), The Philosophy of Sherlock Holmes. University Press of Kentucky.
Bridget McKenney Costello & Gregory Bassham (2012). Sherlock Holmes and the Ethics of Hyperspecialization. In Philip Tallon & David Baggett (eds.), The Philosophy of Sherlock Holmes. University Press of Kentucky.
Charles Taliaferro & Michel Le Gall (2012). Passionate Objectivity in Sherlock Holmes. In Philip Tallon & David Baggett (eds.), The Philosophy of Sherlock Holmes. University Press of Kentucky.
David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs 39 (4):596–631.
Kyle Blanchette (2012). Eliminating the Impossible: Sherlock Holmes and the Supernatural. In Philip Tallon & David Baggett (eds.), The Philosophy of Sherlock Holmes. University Press of Kentucky.
Andrew Terjesen (2012). Was It Morally Wrong to Kill Off Sherlock Holmes? In Philip Tallon & David Baggett (eds.), The Philosophy of Sherlock Holmes. University Press of Kentucky.
Takashi Yagisawa (2001). Against Creationism in Fiction. Noûs 35 (s15):153-172.
Added to index2011-11-25
Total downloads156 ( #4,891 of 1,103,048 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #24,631 of 1,103,048 )
How can I increase my downloads?