David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bioethics 23 (5):274-290 (2009)
According to what we call the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB), couples who decide to have a child have a significant moral reason to select the child who, given his or her genetic endowment, can be expected to enjoy the most well-being. In the first part of this paper, we introduce PB, explain its content, grounds, and implications, and defend it against various objections. In the second part, we argue that PB is superior to competing principles of procreative selection such as that of procreative autonomy. In the third part of the paper, we consider the relation between PB and disability. We develop a revisionary account of disability, in which disability is a species of instrumental badness that is context- and person-relative. Although PB instructs us to aim to reduce disability in future children whenever possible, it does not privilege the normal. What matters is not whether future children meet certain biological or statistical norms, but what level of well-being they can be expected to have.
|Keywords||procreative beneficence reproduction genetic selection enhancement autonomy well‐being ethics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Russell Powell, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2012). Evolution, Genetic Engineering, and Human Enhancement. Philosophy and Technology 25 (4):439-458.
Janet Malek & Judith Daar (2012). The Case for a Parental Duty to Use Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Medical Benefit. American Journal of Bioethics 12 (4):3-11.
R. Tonkens (2011). Parental Wisdom, Empirical Blindness, and Normative Evaluation of Prenatal Genetic Enhancement. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (3):274-295.
Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2010). The Value of Sex in Procreative Reasons. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (7):22-24.
G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2014). Autonomy and Enhancement. Neuroethics 7 (2):123-136.
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