Am externalist account of introspectve knowledge

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):358-78 (1999)
The Content Sceptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Sceptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.
Keywords Epistemology  Externalism  Introspection  Knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00089
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John Kulvicki (2010). Introspective Availability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.

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