Assertion and belief
Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78 (1966)
| Abstract | This paper is written in opposition of various antecedent discussions of Moore’s paradox. It concludes that one cannot make an honest and primary truth-claim by producing ‘p, but I believe not-p’. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Moore's paradox assertion belief | |||||||||
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