Absurdity and spanning

Philosophia 2 (3):227-238 (1972)
Abstract
On the basis of observations J. J. C. Smart once made concerning the absurdity of sentences like 'The seat of the bed is hard', a plausible case can be made that there is little point to developing a theory of types, particularly one of the sort envisaged by Fred Sommers. The authors defend such theories against this objection by a partial elucidation of the distinctions between the concepts of spanning and predicability and between category mistakenness and absurdity in general. The argument suggests that further clarification of the concepts of spanning and category mistakenness should be sought in reflection upon the more familiar concepts of a sort of thing and a predicate category.
Keywords Sommers  J. J. C. Smart  type theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
George Englebretsen (1975). Trivalence and Absurdity. Philosophical Papers 4 (2):121-128.
Similar books and articles
Charles Sayward (1978). Strawson on Categories. Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (3):83-87.
Charles Sayward (1976). A Defense of Sommers. Philosophical Studies 29 (5):343 - 347.
Sergei P. Odintsov (2006). Absurdity as Unary Operator. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):225-242.
Steven Luper (1992). The Absurdity of Life. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:1-17.
John Williams (2007). Moore's Paradoxes and Iterated Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

7 ( #188,122 of 1,102,758 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #296,987 of 1,102,758 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.