Being a realist about relativism (in ethics)

Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):155-176 (1991)
How should a moral realist respond to the (seemingly) abundant evidence diversity provides for relativism? Many think there is only one reasonable response: abandon moral realism. Against them, I argue that moral realists can stand their ground in the face of moral diversity without relying on excessively optimistic arguments or unrealistic assumptions. In the process, I defend two theses: (i) that, far from being incompatible with moral realism, many plausible versions of relativism are _versions of moral realism; and (ii) the best interpretation of the argument from diversity to relativism tells not at all against realist versions of relativism
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DOI 10.1007/BF00385839
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Stefan Sencerz (1995). Moral Facts and the Problem of Justification in Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):368 – 388.

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