David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 70 (February):247-69 (1987)
The problem of semantic content is the problem of explicating those features of brain processes by virtue of which they may properly be thought to possess meaning or reference. This paper criticizes the account of semantic content associated with fodor's version of cognitive science, And offers an alternative account based on mathematical communication theory. Its key concept is that of a neuronal representation maintaining a high-Level of mutual information with a designated external state of affairs under changing conditions of perceptual presentation
|Keywords||Cognitive Content Epistemology Semantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Claude E. Shannon & Warren Weaver (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Karl Pfeifer (1987). Causal Dispositions + Sensory Experience = Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):757.
Itay Shani (2005). Computation and Intentionality: A Recipe for Epistemic Impasse. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 15 (2):207-228.
Chris Fields & Eric Dietrich (1987). Intentionality is a Red Herring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):756.
Kenneth M. Sayre (1987). Various Senses of “Intentional System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):760.
W. Tom Bourbon (1987). A Case of Different Intentions Concerning Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):755.
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