Do Moral Explanations Matter?
Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142 (1989)
| Abstract | Nicholas Sturgeon has claimed that moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. He claims that the correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize all other anti-realist views. This paper argues that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanation is consistent with moral relativism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | moral realism moral relativism noncognitivism Nicholas Sturgeon | |||||||||
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