F.H. Bradley and the Concept of Relative Truth
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Radical Philosophy 59 (59):15-20 (1991)
Few people now read F.H. Bradley and the British Idealists. This is not because they are not important philosophers. On the contrary. It is generally agreed that Bradley, in particular, 2 is a major philosopher, as well as a great, if demanding, writer. It is rather because Bradley and the other Idealists are thought to inhabit a philosophical world quite different from that of the mainstream of contemporary philosophy. They seem to be concerned with issues and problems which have little or nothing to do with the topics which concern most philosophers nowadays.
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