David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):121-38 (1986)
This article responds to two unresolved and crucial problems of cognitive science: (1) What is actually accomplished by functions of the nervous system that we ordinarily describe in the intentional idiom? and (2) What makes the information processing involved in these functions semantic? It is argued that, contrary to the assumptions of many cognitive theorists, the computational approach does not provide coherent answers to these problems, and that a more promising start would be to fall back on mathematical communication theory and, with the help of evolutionary biology and neurophysiology, to attempt a characterization of the adaptive processes involved in visual perception. Visual representations are explained as patterns of cortical activity that are enabled to focus on objects in the changing visual environment by constantly adjusting to maintain levels of mutual information between pattern and object that are adequate for continuing perceptual control. In these terms, the answer proposed to (1) is that the intentional functions of vision are those involved in the establishment and maintenance of such representations, and to (2) that semantic features are added to the information processes of vision with the focus on objects that these representations accomplish. The article concludes with proposals for extending this account of intentionality to the higher domains of conceptualization and reason, and with speculation about how semantic information-processing might be achieved in mechanical systems
|Keywords||artificial intelligence cognitive science communication theory computational models information processing intentionality mental representation philosophy of mind vision|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Alan Ross Anderson & Kenneth M. Sayre (1966). Recognition: A Study in the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (65):387.
W. Ross Ashby (1956). An Introduction to Cybernetics. New York, J. Wiley.
Aaron Ben-zeev (1984). The Kantian Revolution in Perception. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (1):69–84.
Jonathan Bennett (1983). Cognitive Ethology: Theory or Poetry? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):356.
Jonathan Francis Bennett (1976). Linguistic Behaviour. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Margaret A. Boden (1994). Representational Redescription: A Question of Sequence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):708.
Karl Pfeifer (1987). Causal Dispositions + Sensory Experience = Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):757.
Kenneth M. Sayre (1987). Various Senses of “Intentional System”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):760.
W. Tom Bourbon (1987). A Case of Different Intentions Concerning Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):755.
David Estes (1994). Developmental Psychology for the Twenty-First Century. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):715.
Similar books and articles
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1997). Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino (2011). Information Processing, Computation, and Cognition. Journal of Biological Physics 37 (1):1-38.
Rajendra D. Badgaiyan (2002). Nonconscious Processing, Anterior Cingulate, and Catatonia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):578-579.
William P. Bechtel (1995). Consciousness: Perspectives From Symbolic and Connectionist AI. Neuropsychologia.
Thomas Metzinger (1988). Review. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 29 (1):143-146.
Ansgar Beckermann (1994). Can There Be a Language of Thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino (2010). Computation Vs. Information Processing: Why Their Difference Matters to Cognitive Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):237-246.
Anthony Chemero (2003). Information for Perception and Information Processing. Minds and Machines 13 (4):577-588.
Vinod Goel (1991). Notationality and the Information Processing Mind. Minds and Machines 1 (2):129-166.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?