Is an Unpictorial Mathematical Platonism Possible?

Abstract
In his book 'Wittgenstein on the foundations of Mathematics', Crispin Wright notes that remarkably little has been done to provide an unpictorial, substantial account of what mathematical platoninism comes to. Wright proposes to investigate whether there is not some more substantial doctrine than the familiar images underpinning the platonist view. He begins with the suggestion that the essential element in the platonist claim is that mathematical truth is objective. Although he does not demarcate them as such, Wright proposes several different tests for objectivity. The paper finds problems with each of these tests.
Keywords crispin wright, platonism, objectivity
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