On the relevance of ignorance to the demands of morality
| Abstract | In Morality, Bernard Gert argues that the fundamental demands of morality are well articulated by ten distinct, and relatively simple, rules. These rules, he holds, are such that any person, no matter what her circumstances or interests, would be rational in accepting, and guiding her choices by, them. The rules themselves are comfortably familiar (e.g. “Do not kill,” “Do not deceive,” “Keep your promises”) and sit well as intuitively plausible. Yet the rules are not, Gert argues, to be accepted merely because they are intuitively attractive, nor because they are already widely recognized, but because they stand as the only set of rules that can qualify as appropriately acceptable to all rational beings. | |||||||||
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Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). Permissibility and Violable Rules. Philosophia 36 (3):367-374.
Andrew Alexandra & Seumas Miller (2009). Ethical Theory, “Common Morality,” and Professional Obligations. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (1):69-80.
Bruce N. Waller (1997). What Rationality Adds to Animal Morality. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3).
Robert E. Goodin (2009). Demandingness as a Virtue. Journal of Ethics 13 (1):1 - 13.
Bernard Gert (1998). Morality: Its Nature and Justification. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Gert (1988). Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Gert (2004). Common Morality: Deciding What to Do. Oxford University Press.
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