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- Ayse P. Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman (2000). Turing Test: 50 Years Later. Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.The Turing Test is one of the most disputed topics in artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper is a review of the past 50 years of the Turing Test. Philosophical debates, practical developments and repercussions in related disciplines are all covered. We discuss Turing''s ideas in detail and present the important comments that have been made on them. Within this context, behaviorism, consciousness, the `other minds'' problem, and similar topics in philosophy of mind are discussed. We also cover the sociological and psychological aspects of the Turing Test. Finally, we look at the current situation and analyze programs that have been developed with the aim of passing the Turing Test. We conclude that the Turing Test has been, and will continue to be, an influential and controversial topic.
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