What is a second order theory committed to?
Erkenntnis 20 (1):79 - 91 (1983)
| Abstract | The paper argues that no second order theory is ontologically commited to anything beyond what its individual variables range over. | |||||||||
| Keywords | second order quantification | |||||||||
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Uriah Kriegel (2006). The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
Nino B. Cocchiarella (2001). A Conceptualist Interpretation of Lesniewski's Ontology. History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):29-43.
Peter Roeper (2004). First- and Second-Order Logic of Mass Terms. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (3):261-297.
S. Awodey & C. Butz (2000). Topological Completeness for Higher-Order Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (3):1168-1182.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1982). Indenumerability and Substitutional Quantification. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (4):358-366.
Helen Morris Cartwright (1993). On Plural Reference and Elementary Set Theory. Synthese 96 (2):201 - 254.
Philippe De Rouilhan (2002). On What There Are. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102:183 - 200.
Raymond M. Smullyan (1968). First-Order Logic. New York [Etc.]Springer-Verlag.
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