Affordances explained

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):949-961 (2003)
I examine the central theoretical construct of ecological psychology, the concept of an affordance. In the first part of the paper, I illustrate the role affordances play in Gibson's theory of perception. In the second part, I argue that affordances are to be understood as dispositional properties, and explain what I take to be their characteristic background circumstances, triggering circumstances and manifestations. The main purpose of my analysis is to give affordances a theoretical identity enriched by Gibson's visionary insight, but independent of the most controversial claims of the Gibsonian movement
Keywords Ecology  Perception  Psychology  Science  Gibson, J
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DOI 10.1086/377380
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Silvano Zipoli Caiani (2014). Extending the Notion of Affordance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):275-293.
Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
Donnchadh O.’Conaill (2014). The Space of Motivations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):440-455.

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