David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 31 (2):137-149 (2012)
In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature of the object. Plato explores many alternative candidates of individuation accounts of objects of true belief, which he discards. I conclude with a Platonic sketch of a teleological account of individuation which would satisfy his requirements of turning true belief into knowledge
|Keywords||Plato Epistemology Knowledge Individuation|
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References found in this work BETA
R. E. Allen (1960). Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues. Philosophical Review 69 (2):147-164.
Hugh H. Benson (ed.) (1992). Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates. Oxford University Press.
Gail Fine (1978). Knowledge and Belief in Republic V. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (2):121-39.
Gail Fine, Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII. Companions to Ancient Thought I.
Francisco Gonzalez (1996). Propositions or Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and Belief in Republic V. Phronesis 41 (3):245-275.
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