Metaphysics and morals

In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Columbia University Press 7 - 22 (2010)
This essay argues that normative judgments, in general, and moral judgments, in particular, are "truth apt" and can be objects of belief. Other main claims are: judgments about reasons, if interpreted as true, do not have metaphysical implications that are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. Two kinds of normative claims should be distinguished: substantive claims about what reasons people have and structural claims about what attitudes people must have insofar as they are rational. Employing this distinction, the practical significance of substantive normative judgments is explained, and critical analysis of expressivist and Kantian views on this question is offered
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DOI 10.2307/3219738
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Stephen Finlay (2007). Four Faces of Moral Realism. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.

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