David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays for Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press (2002)
This sense of attributability, or internality, is the quarry in many of Frankfurt's articles, and it has proved to be an elusive one. In this paper I want to explore, in a tentative fashion, the question of why we should be interested in finding this quarry. It seems to me that there are at least two quite distinct kinds of reason for this concern, and that when they are distinguished the problem may look less difficult than it has seemed.
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Tamar Schapiro (2014). What Are Theories of Desire Theories Of? Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):131-150.
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