Graduate studies at Western
Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):375-382 (1986)
|Abstract||I argue that in "en", Aristotle allows not only for weak akrasia but also for "strong akrasia". In weak akrasia, The agent makes only a "nominal" choice according to the right principle, While in strong akrasia he/she makes a "real" choice, But still acts against it. I show that, Although aristotle does not give a detailed account of strong akrasia, Such an account can be reconstructed on the basis of the analyses and examples of choice and akratic behaviour provided by him in "en" and "de motu"|
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