Against A Priori reductions

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586 (2006)
Abstract
From Plato down to the logical empiricists, philosophers assumed that all empirical knowledge must rest on apriori semantic foundations. According to this philosophical tradition, empirical knowledge is possible only if the subject has an implicit apriori understanding of what it is her words and concepts refer to. You can
Keywords CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
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    References found in this work BETA
    David J. Chalmers (2002). On Sense and Intension. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):135-82.
    Frank Jackson (1998). Reference and Description Revisited. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):201-218.

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