Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553 (2010)
People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right to say that the person lacks the belief
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Knowing That P Without Believing That P. Noûs 47 (2):371-384.
Declan Smithies (2012). The Mental Lives of Zombies. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
Neil Levy (2013). The Importance of Awareness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229.
David Hunter (2011). Alienated Belief. Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.
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