A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports
Noûs 40 (2):361-368 (2006)
| Abstract | (1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms | |||||||||
| Keywords | Belief Direct Epistemology Proposition Reference Report Term | |||||||||
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