A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports

Noûs 40 (2):361-368 (2006)
Abstract
(1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms.
Keywords Belief  Direct  Epistemology  Proposition  Reference  Report  Term
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DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00614.x
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References found in this work BETA
David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.

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Citations of this work BETA
Andrea Onofri (2013). On Non-Pragmatic Millianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.

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