A plea for plurealism

Erkenntnis 52 (2):161-173 (2000)
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Abstract

In contrast to monistic realism (as represented by Peirce) and pluralistic irrealism (as represented by Goodman) I argue for what I call plurealism, a view which is both pluralistic and realist, recognizing different worlds that are not only independent of one another, but also independent of us.

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Citations of this work

The strict analysis and the open discussion.Katariina Holma - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (3):325-338.
Goodman’s Many Worlds.Alexandre Declos - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (6):1-25.
The Strict Analysis and the Open Discussion.Katariina Holma - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (3):325-338.
Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman’s Pluralism.Xavier De Donato-Rodríguez - 2009 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 24 (2):213-225.

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References found in this work

Ways of worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Hassocks [Eng.]: Harvester Press.
The Fixation of Belief.Charles S. Peirce - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 37-49.

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