David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65 (2008)
In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren’t genuinely related. We argue that Preston’s proffered solution here—to treat property instances as “mental constructs”—is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to show how, by fine-tuning the nature of bare particulars, treating them as abstract modes of things rather than concrete particulars, the traditional realist can neatly evade Preston’s puzzle
|Keywords||Property instances Realism Bare particulars Individuation|
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
Gustav Bergmann (1967). Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. University of Wisconsin Press.
F. H. Bradley (1893/1969). Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay,. New York [Etc.]Oxford U.P..
Keith Campbell (1990). Abstract Particulars. B. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Jesse M. Mulder (2013). The Essentialist Inference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):755-769.
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